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The anti-gas respirator (gas mask) is a ubiquitous artifact of 20th 
century total war. Introduced in 1915, 
respirators dramatically transformed 
the appearance of soldiers, replacing 
the last trace of a man’s unique identity 
with a ghoulish facade that quickly 
became a perennial favourite of war 
artists and illustrators. Throughout 
the 90 years since the First World War, 
anti-gas equipment has remained a 
vital part of every soldier’s kit just as 
it has persisted as a versatile prop in 
popular culture. Surplus respirators 
can found everywhere from the Star 
Wars trilogy (as alien costume props) 
to Earth Day marches (as symbols of 
protest against air pollution). 
 This article considers the Canadian 
development and manufacture of 
Mark IV anti-gas respirators prior to 
and during the Second World War, 
tracing the genesis of an artifact from 
the drawing board to the soldier’s 
kit. The Mark IV pattern, originally 
developed in Britain in the 1920s, was 
the standard respirator in Empire and 
Commonwealth service throughout 
much of the Second World War. 
Beginning in the early 1930s, 
Canadian army officers realized the 
urgent requirement for modern anti-
gas equipment, but they did not wish 
to depend upon Britain for future 
supplies. As such, the Canadian 
army joined forces with domestic 
industry to develop a homegrown 
manufacturing capability where 
none had existed before. Ultimately, 
the Mark IV development history 
sheds light not only on an important 
chemical warfare artifact, but also 
more generally on the manufacturing 
infrastructure that was developed in 
Canada at the eleventh hour to meet 
the massive output requirements of 
the Second World War. In this respect, 
the respirator case study shares much 
in common with more complex 
objects, such as the Canadian Military 
Pattern trucks that were built en 
masse at Windsor and Oshawa 
according to British War Office 
specifications. The respirators, like 
Abstract: Total war in the 20th century 
witnessed an ever increasing complexity 
in soldiers’ weapons and equipment. 
Although the state was responsible 
for procuring war material, the design 
and development process was often a 
joint venture between government and 
private industry. This article considers 
that relationship in the material-
cultural context of Canadian anti-gas 
respirator manufacture prior to and 
during the Second World War. Because 
domestic industries had no experience 
with military-grade respirators, it was 
necessary to spend heavily on product 
development. The government not 
only avoided sharing this cost with 
manufacturers, but also refused any 
definite contracts, thanks to Depression-
era budget constraints. Only when 
the threat of war grew more certain 
in the late 1930s did eleventh-hour 
public expenditure stimulate the full 
development of manufacturing capacity. 
By 1940-41, domestic industry was 
able to manufacture enough anti-gas 
equipment for the Canadian forces, as 
well as supply various components to 
allied forces.
Résumé : Au vingtième siècle, la guerre 
totale fut marquée par la complexification 
grandissante de l’équipement et des 
armes des combattants. En dépit de 
la responsabilité gouvernementale 
de fournir ce matériel de guerre, le 
processus de sa création et de son 
développement a souvent été le fruit 
d’une association du gouvernement 
et de l’industrie privée. Le présent 
article analyse cette relation dans 
le contexte de la culture matérielle 
liée à la production canadienne de 
masques à gaz, avant et pendant la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale. Comme les 
entreprises du pays n’avaient aucune 
expérience dans la fabrication de ce 
type d’appareil respiratoire utilisé 
comme arme, son développement a 
nécessité d’importants investissements. 
Or, le gouvernement a non seulement 
évité d’en partager les coûts avec les 
manufacturiers, mais il a aussi refusé  
tout contrat précis s’y rattachant, 
prétextant les contraintes budgétaires 
de l’époque de la Dépression. Il fallut 
attendre que la menace d’une guerre 
certaine s’accentue, à la fin des années 
1930, pour que des fonds publics 
soient dégagés à la dernière minute 
et assurent la pleine capacité de 
production de l’industrie. Dès 1940 
et 1941, les manufactures du pays 
furent donc en mesure de fabriquer 
assez d’équipement contre les gaz pour 
les Forces canadiennes et d’autres 
composantes pour leurs alliés.
Iarocci - Anti-Gas Respirators.indd   51 1/26/2010   10:23:17 AM
1
: “A Unique Art” Canadian Anti-Gas Respirator Production in the Second World War
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
52
the trucks, were not fashioned out 
of thin air. Rather, they were the 
products of joint efforts across the 
Dominion, coordinated at virtually 
the last minute to manufacture 
serviceable equipment on a grand 
scale. 
Anti-Gas Respirators in 
British Empire Service, 1915-43
The Great War witnessed a steady evolution in anti-gas equipment, 
beginning with the Second Battle of 
Ypres in April 1915. The earliest form 
of protection issued to hard pressed 
British and Canadian troops at that 
time was a simple wade of cotton, 
held between the teeth, beneath a 
cloth mask impregnated with an 
anti-gas solution and tied over the 
nose and mouth. As soon as the 
chlorine attack became a matter of 
public knowledge, the War Office 
issued a general appeal for large 
quantities of these primitive masks, 
with instructions that they be sent in 
batches of 100 or more to the Chief 
Ordnance Officer at the Royal Army 
Clothing Department.1 It was not 
long, however, before mask designs 
reached a level of sophistication that 
exceeded the sewing capabilities of 
various patriotic associations and 
other local groups. 
 By May 1915, most soldiers in the 
1st Canadian Division had received 
the simple cotton respirators. At the 
same time, these were supplemented 
with the smoke helmet (also known 
as the hypo helmet), an impregnated 
bag that covered the entire head, and 
featured transparent mica or acetoid 
eye pieces. By August, every man in 
the division should have received a 
cotton respirator and a smoke helmet, 
while certain specialist troops in the 
division, such as machine gun crews, 
were equipped with an even newer 
style of respirator known as the tube 
helmet. The tube helmet differed 
from the earlier smoke helmet in that 
it was fitted with a valve tube through 
which the soldier could exhale – a 
feature that helped eliminate carbon 
dioxide build-up inside the hood. 
(When inhaling, a soldier’s breath 
was filtered through the fabric of the 
hood itself, which was chemically 
treated in the same manner as earlier 
types.) Improved tube helmets, which 
were impregnated with an upgraded 
solution that offered protection 
against phosgene, were designated 
as “P” (phenate) helmets.2 Canadian 
soldiers were each supposed to 
carry one smoke helmet and one 
tube helmet as of October 1915.3 
Beginning  in  February  1916 , 
P helmets were gradually replaced 
by PH (phenate-hexamine) helmets, 
offering improved protection against 
phosgene. It appears that artillerymen 
were among the first soldiers to 
receive PH helmets in Canadian 
service, followed by a general issue 
to all trades and ranks that spring. 
 As the PH helmet was entering 
general service, an entirely novel 
pattern of anti-gas respirator, the 
large-box type (LBR), was introduced 
to British forces. Like the tube helmets, 
the LBRs were at first provided 
only to specialist personnel such as 
gunners, trench mortar and machine 
gun crews, and field ambulance 
men, in part because the new 
apparatus was considered too bulky 
for already overburdened infantry 
soldiers. However, by October 1916, 
as Canadian forces went into action 
on the Somme, the newer small- 
box respirator (SBR) was issued on 
a scale of one per man across the 
Canadian Corps, reflecting a similar 
trend in the British forces. Each man 
Canon F.G. Scott, the highly 
revered chaplain to 1st Canadian 
Division, wears a small-box 
respirator on the Western Front, 
September 1917. Note how the 
connecting tube leads to the 
filter container carried within 
the haversack on Scott’s 
chest.
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also continued to carry a PH helmet 
and one pair of anti-gas goggles as 
precautionary measures.
 The face piece of the SBR was 
made of a rubberized canvas material 
similar to the type used in some 
German masks. In contrast with 
German models, which featured 
a directly mounted charcoal filter 
canister, the box respirator face piece 
was connected to a corrugated tube, 
which in turn mated up with the 
filter element – known at the time as 
a “tower” and later as a “container.” 
The tower was supported inside the 
khaki canvas respirator haversack, 
which was carried on the soldier’s 
chest. While the German pattern 
of mask was more compact, British 
authorities considered the box 
respirator to be a superior design. The 
weight of the filter was supported by 
the haversack, and thus did not pull 
the face piece away from the soldier’s 
forehead and cheeks. This problem 
with the German design allowed 
traces of gas to seep in behind the 
face piece. There is some evidence 
that German soldiers, not realizing 
that the seal between face piece and 
skin had been broken, assumed 
incorrectly that the filter itself was 
chemically inefficient, thereby 
losing confidence in their masks. 
Interestingly, cultural determinism 
crept into Brit ish intell igence 
estimates, which suggested that 
“the British soldier, being more of 
an individualist [than the German], 
can better understand the seclusion 
imposed by wearing a mask,” and 
was thus a more effective operator 
in a chemical warfare environment.4 
This dubious theory was probably 
never tested.
 Much of the credit for the 
British development of the box-type 
respirator went to the soldier-scientist 
E.F. Harrison. An accomplished 
pharmaceutical research chemist 
in civil life, Harrison joined the 
Sportsmen’s Battalion as an unlikely 
47-year-old private in 1915.5 After the 
German chlorine attack against the 
Ypres salient that April, he transferred 
to the Royal Engineers, where his 
peacetime skills could be applied 
to more productive ends. Harrison 
quickly distinguished himself as 
an inventor of anti-gas equipment, 
and was promoted to the rank of 
lieutenant-colonel in 1917. He later 
became the controller of chemical 
warfare, a post which ultimately cost 
him his life. One week before the 
war ended, Harrison succumbed to 
pneumonia aggravated by repeated 
exposure to a deadly mélange of 
chemicals during his respirator 
experiments. In 1921 a monument 
was unveiled in his honour in the 
Hall of the Pharmaceutical Society, 
at Bloomsbury Square. Newspaper 
reports lauded Harrison as man 
whose invention “saved the British 
Army.”6 
 Although specific materials 
and construction were improved 
considerably, the basic scheme of the 
box respirator remained unchanged 
in British Empire and Commonwealth 
forces until the middle years of the 
Second World War. Indeed, Major 
John Ambrose Sadd, Harrison’s co-
An NCO checks the fit of small-box respirators 
during anti-gas training somewhere on the 
Western Front.
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inventor of the original box respirator 
in 1916, claimed patent rights for 
the Mark IV series employed during 
the 1930s and 1940s.7 Like the SBR, 
the Mark IV comprised a face piece, 
connecting tube, and container. 
The face piece was fashioned of 
molded vulcanized rubber with 
separate glass eye piece discs. On 
early models, both the face piece and 
the corrugated rubber connecting 
tube were covered in khaki stockinet 
fabric. The purpose of the stockinet is 
unclear, but it was later discontinued, 
possibly for economic reasons, or 
because, as a porous fabric, it was 
difficult to decontaminate. The filter 
container, of ribbed sheet metal, 
incorporated a simple male fitting 
which mated with the lower female 
end of the connecting tube. Like the 
SBR, the Mark IV respirator was 
carried in a khaki haversack. When 
not required, the haversack could be 
slung over the shoulder. According to 
tactical circumstances, the haversack 
was to be worn on the chest in the 
ready position. In 
the event of a gas 
alarm, the face piece was pulled from 
the top of the haversack and fitted 
to the soldier’s head. The container 
rested in the bottom of the haversack, 
as with the SBR.
 In common with most other pieces 
of military kit, the Mark IV respirator 
was followed by several variants 
and sub-variants (Table A). By way 
of summary, the Mark IV Special 
series incorporated an aperture on 
the left cheek that was fitted with a 
replaceable plastic 
cap for fitting a 
m i c r o p h o n e . 
Some versions 
a l s o  h a d 
p r o v i s i o n 
for wearing 
eye glasses 
beneath the 
face piece.8 
A  l a t e r 
variant, the 
Mark V, was 
introduced just 
as the Second World 
War broke out.9 In 
place of a pre-fitted 
aperture, the Mark 
V incorporated a one-
inch cylindrical boss on 
the left cheek of the face 
piece. If required, the boss 
could be punched out and fitted 
with a plug for a microphone.10 A 
second important difference between 
the Mark IV and Mark V respirators 
can be seen in their manufacture 
techniques, at least within a Canadian 
context. In Canada, the face piece 
for the Mark IV was crafted in 
hand molds, while the Mark V face 
piece was made in machine press 
molds. Different types of rubber 
were employed in each case. Shortly 
after the outbreak of war, it cost the 
Canadian government about $7.65 for 
each Mark IV respirator, including 
the haversack and anti-dimming 
compound for the eye pieces. A Mark 
V cost about one dollar less.11 
 The Mark IV respirators and 
subsequent variants were issued to 
army, navy, and air force personnel, 
with the exception that a longer 
connecting tube was f itted to 
naval and air force models. This 
modification permitted the haversack 
to be worn on the sailor or airman/
woman’s back when the respirator 
was deployed, as it was not practical 
for specialists and technicians to 
carry the haversack on their chests 
while working on machinery or in the 
tight quarters of a ship or aircraft. In 
February 1943, however, the number 
of extended tubes issued to RCAF 
personnel was reduced as a rubber 
saving measure.12 It is uncertain if the 
RCN similarly restricted the issue of 
the longer connecting tubes. 
 Beginning in  late  1942 or 
early 1943 an improved respirator 
Table A – Mark IV and V Respirator Variants
Designation Key Features Purpose
Mark IV, early issue
Made of red rubber,  covered 
with khaki stockinet; eye pieces 
permanently installed
General issue
Mark IV, later issue
Made of black rubber, sometimes 
with stockinet; eye pieces removable; 
improved voice-mitter
General issue, priority given to 
officers and NCOs because of 
improved voice-mitter
Mark IV Special T Similar to later issue Mark IV, but 
with modifications to the temples
For personnel wearing eye glasses
Mark IV Special T Mic As above, but fitted with the capped aperture for a microphone plug For signals personnel
Mark V
As above,  without stockinet, 
featuring molded cheek boss for 
fitting microphone plug, suited for 
personnel wearing eye glasses
For signals personnel and those 
wearing eye glasses
Mark IVA and Mark VA As with the Mark IV and V series, but 
fitted with longer connecting tubes
For naval and air force technicians 
and specialist personnel
Based on “Respirators, Anti-Gas,” App A, 5 March 1940, HQ 56-23 (vol 14), Vol 5921, RG 24.
A Canadian Mk IV 
respirator; the face piece 
on this example was made 
by Gutta Percha & Rubber 
Limited, Toronto, in 1940. 
Note that both the face piece and 
the connecting tube are covered with 
khaki stockinet.
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was introduced in British and 
Commonwealth service, known 
prosaically as the “respirator, anti-
gas, light,” or more simply, the 
light respirator. Although beyond 
the scope of this article, the light 
respirator employed a face piece 
similar to the Mark IV series, 
except that it dispensed entirely 
with the connecting hose. Instead, 
a cylindrical container not unlike 
the German pattern was screwed 
directly to the left cheek of the face 
piece. The entire assembly was 
carried in the rectangular Mark I 
or II light haversacks.13 This model 
is mentioned here because its 
introduction influenced the issue 
of Mark IV series respirators and 
containers later in the war.
Gas in the Interwar Years
The Canadian military neglected its chemical warfare capabilities and 
defensive measures during the 1920s, 
despite the general belief that gas 
would almost certainly be used in the 
next major conflict.14 George Witten, 
a newspaperman and South African 
war veteran who narrowly survived 
four years overseas during the Great 
War, wrote in 1926 that gas was 
not only the most humane weapon 
available, but also the most 
efficient. Witten himself 
had been injured on four 
occasions – by small 
arms fire, shellfire, 
mine detonation, 
and gas. While 
t h e  g a s s i n g 
incapacitated 
h i m  j u s t  a s 
fu l ly  as  the 
other injuries, 
Witten claimed 
that gassing was 
far less painful, 
and produced 
fewer long-term 
d i s a b i l i t i e s . 
Without citing 
any evidence, 
he applied this 
general conclusion 
to many other gas 
v i c t ims ,  c l a im ing 
further that gas was the 
“most effective” weapon known. This 
was questionable at best; although 
heavily employed between 1915 
and 1918 on the Western Front, 
few battlefield victories were solely 
attributable to gas. Yet if Witten 
predicted incorrectly that gas was to 
be crowned king of the battlefield, 
his warning that troops must be 
equipped and trained to deal with 
i t  was undoubtedly well 
advised.15 
 Witten was partly vindicated 
during the 1930s as chemical weapons 
were in fact employed in limited wars 
around the world, including the 
Italian campaign in Ethiopia and the 
Japanese war against China. These 
cases of gas warfare, combined with 
the increasing long-range capabilities 
of heavy bombers, spread fears 
that civilians would be targeted in 
massive chemical offensives from the 
air. Horrifying, if also hypothetical, 
reports on the destructive capacity of 
gas fed the hysteria. As an American 
military chemist noted in 1937, the 
matter of chemical warfare “has 
been the happy hunting ground for 
sensational newspaper and magazine 
A Canadian Mk IV Special T Mic 
respirator; the face piece on this 
example was made by 
the  B.F.  Goodr ich 
Company, Kitchener, 
1 9 4 1 .  N o t e  t h e 
removable plastic cap 
on the cheek for fitting 
a microphone plug as 
required.
Sailors wearing respirator haversacks 
line up for a refill. As naval personnel, 
these men have probably been issued 
Mark IVA or VA respirators, which 
featured a longer connecting tube than 
the standard Mark IV or V. This feature 
permitted the haversack to be carried in 
knapsack-fashion while the sailor was 
wearing his mask in the close confines 
of a ship. The air force also used this 
type in large numbers.
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writers whose imaginations have 
furnished lurid pictures of whole 
populations being wiped out at a 
single blow with poison gas dropped 
from airplanes.”16 Some gas experts 
– and others who claimed to be – 
insisted that while gas would be 
used in future wars, its potential 
impact was very much exaggerated 
in most accounts.17 Yet even if gas 
was not to be a decisive weapon or 
an instrument of Armageddon, any 
army not prepared to confront it was 
sure to suffer.
Making Respirators in 
Canada
Canadian authorities did not wait for the outbreak of another 
global war to take action on the 
gas front. Although the Dominion 
government was not yet prepared 
to commit substantial resources to 
defence research and development in 
the midst of a crippling depression, 
the potential for conflict was enough 
for policy-makers to explore Canada’s 
ability to manufacture it own military 
equipment.18 In June 1932, Major 
G.P. Morrison, an artillery officer 
posted to Petawawa Camp, made an 
exploratory visit to the Safety Supply 
Company, a Toronto wholesaler 
and manufacturer of mining and 
industrial safety equipment. The 
company’s manager, R.C. Fuller, 
had taken an interest  in  the 
manufacture of anti-gas respirators 
for industrial applications, but his 
company had not yet developed 
any prototype for military use. Part 
of the problem was that Canadian 
rubber companies possessed neither 
the tooling for molding masks, nor 
the mixing recipe and vulcanizing 
technique for producing service-
grade rubber; such trade secrets 
were closely guarded by the well-
established British manufacturers 
of respirator components.19 Indeed, 
British companies such as Siebe 
Gorman, a well known maker of 
diving equipment, had been selling 
military style respirators on the 
international market since 1918, a 
practice that was encouraged by His 
Majesty’s government in order to 
keep the industry viable in the event 
of a national emergency. In 1936, 
the Bata Company, then based in 
Czechoslovakia, purchased licensing 
rights from the British for the Mark 
IV-style respirator. (Like Canada, the 
Czech government was tooling up for 
a possible war with Germany.) Fatra, 
a Bata subsidiary, manufactured 
complete masks based on the British 
pattern. According to a 1942 Bata 
report, Fatra achieved an almost 
unbelievable production capacity 
of 25,000 masks per day before the 
war. Many Fatra respirators were 
even sold back to the British.20 While 
Canada could also import respirators 
to fill immediate requirements 
for the mid 1930s, officials at the 
Department of National Defence 
(DND) ultimately wanted to develop 
a domestic manufacturing capacity 
not unlike the Bata/Fatra model in 
Czechoslovkia.21 
 To assist Fuller in his efforts to 
develop a manufacturing scheme 
for the standard Mk IV respirator, 
Morrison arranged to loan him the 
molds for the respirator valve and 
face piece. It would be up to the 
Safety Supply Company to determine 
the rubber recipe and vulcanization 
process. Progress was slow, as Fuller 
experienced difficulty finding a plant 
capable of replicating and molding 
the correct grade of rubber. Fuller 
finally reached an agreement with the 
Stokes Rubber Company of Welland, 
Ontario, but Stokes had little to show 
for its efforts in January 1933 when 
Morrison again touched base with 
him. As Fuller explained, Stokes 
felt that the molding process should 
more fully incorporate machine press 
molds, in place of hand molding.22 
Morrison countered that a complete 
set of press molds would be too 
expensive to create, and that they 
would do a poor job of shaping 
Private Arnold Todd, of the Algonquin 
Regiment, models his Mark IV respirator 
at Port Arthur, Ontario, February 1941. 
Todd, who survived the Northwest 
Europe campaign of 1944-45, had this 
photograph taken so that his family 
could see his appearance in fighting 
equipment and respirator. Note that 
the Mark IV respirator is worn in the 
same fashion as the earlier small-box 
respirator.
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the complex features of the face 
piece. In either case, upon visiting 
Stokes’s Welland plant in February, 
Morrison deemed the facility entirely 
unsuited for large scale face piece 
manufacturing.23 
 Another year passed before 
Safety Supply once again explored 
the matter of face piece manufacture, 
this time in conjunction with the B.F. 
Goodrich Company of Kitchener, 
Ontario. In addition to the face piece, 
Morrison now also expressed an 
interest in making the corrugated 
rubber connecting tube that joined 
the face piece to the container (filter 
element or canister). But again, since 
no hose molds existed in Canada, 
it was left up to the manufacturer 
to come up with a procedure that 
would meet specifications.24 As far 
as the face pieces were concerned, 
Fuller reported in May 1934 that a 
couple of examples had finally been 
completed by Goodrich, and were to 
be submitted to DND for inspection.25
 In the meantime, impatient 
military officials had contacted 
the chief inspector of arms and 
ammunition (CIAA) at Dominion 
Arsenals in Quebec to determine if the 
Mark IV respirator face pieces could 
be manufactured in the DA workshops 
by government employees.26 Given 
that Fuller had managed to deliver 
the Goodrich face pieces at the 
eleventh hour, Lieutenant-Colonel 
N.O. Carr (then serving as GSO I 
artillery), intervened, suggesting 
that individual components of the 
Mark IV respirator, such as the 
face pieces, should be produced by 
private companies, only to undergo 
final assembly at Dominion Arsenals. 
Such an arrangement would not only 
distribute the economic fruits of 
government contracts more broadly 
around the country, but by virtue 
of geographic dispersal, would also 
protect war production capacity 
against the threat of sabotage or 
enemy attacks. It would also free 
plant capacity in government facilities 
such as Dominion Arsenals. For the 
moment, however, manufacturing 
experiments would be limited to the 
respirators and connecting tubes. 
Due to some complexities in the 
container construction, these would 
have to wait until a later date for 
exploration.27
 The prototype masks from 
Goodrich were by no means free of 
defects, but they were good enough to 
warrant continued cooperation from 
DND. To this end, Morrison provided 
Five members of the Women’s Royal Canadian Naval Service (WRENS) sport what appear to be Mark IVA Special T Mic respirators. 
This variant of the Mark IV featured a capped aperture for fitting a microphone to the left cheek, as well as a lengthened 
connected tube, so that the mask could be worn with the haversack carried at the lower side or on the back. Such respirators 
were issued mainly to naval or air force personnel. Note that the women have stencilled their names on the haversack straps.
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the Kitchener office with additional 
specifications pertaining to the face 
piece, connecting tube, as well as the 
khaki stockinet material that was 
used to cover both components. The 
complexity of the manufacturing 
process is evident in the fact that 
about 100 engineering drawings 
were necessary to illustrate all of the 
components for the face piece and 
hose. Further development work 
at Goodrich was delayed when 
Safety Supply misplaced some of 
these drawings.28 Canadian military 
officials had little choice but to 
remain polite, since Safety Supply 
and Goodrich were undertaking 
the development work at their own 
expense. Without any government 
funding, there was minimal incentive 
for the companies to hurry along their 
efforts to develop a product for which 
there was, as of yet, no certain mass 
demand. 
 In face of limited Canadian 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  c a p a c i t y,  t h e 
government had two short term 
options. The first was to purchase 
masks from the British, as had been 
the usual practice since the Great 
War. The second was to make funding 
available for serious research and 
development in Canadian industry.29 
Lieutenant-Colonel George Pearkes, 
then serving as a general staff officer 
for the director of military training 
and staff duties, estimated in 1934 that 
if somewhere between $10,000 and 
$15,000 worth funding was provided 
during 1935-36, “the production of a 
Canadian respirator, less container, 
will be an accomplished fact.”30 The 
catch was that the Canadian army 
needed new masks immediately. 
At the time there were only 1,449 
serviceable masks in the country, 
far too few to equip the Permanent 
Force, let alone provide for anti-gas 
training in the Militia. Although 
somewhere between 700 and 2,500 
new masks were needed in the short 
run to make up for shortfalls, Pearkes 
recommended that purchases be 
delayed if it meant saving funds for 
research and development. Major-
General A.G.L. McNaughton, in 
the post of chief of the general staff 
(CGS), agreed with Pearkes. The draft 
budget estimates for 1935-36 included 
$15,000 for the domestic manufacture 
of respirators. Ultimately, $10,000 was 
approved for that fiscal year.31 
 The new funding stimulated 
development work at Goodrich in 
Kitchener, and also attracted the 
interest of Gutta Percha & Rubber 
Limited, a Toronto-based company. 
(Safety Supply seems by then to 
have fallen by the wayside as a 
redundant middleman.) A technical 
representative from Gutta Percha 
was confident that his outfit would be 
able to meet the rubber specifications; 
he even suggested that recently 
developed synthetic materials might 
be used.32 Government inspection 
visits to the Goodrich and Gutta 
Percha plants revealed each to 
be excellently equipped with the 
necessary machinery and laboratory 
equipment .  At  present ,  these 
facilities were dedicated largely to 
the production of rubber footwear, 
but there was no technical reason 
why they could not switch over to 
respirators, once the details of the 
rubber compounds and molding 
techniques were worked out.33
 Goodrich and Gutta Percha 
continued with limited experiments 
throughout the winter of 1935, but 
failed to achieve satisfactory results. 
Neither company, according to a key 
April 1936 defence memorandum, 
had quite mastered the molding 
or vulcanizing techniques. Major 
Morrison, the artillery officer who 
had originally visited the Safety 
Supply Company four years earlier, 
recognized that unless the government 
offered the companies a true incentive 
to invest more research time and 
effort in the respirator problem, it 
was unlikely that a solution could be 
found in the near future. Accordingly, 
Morrison suggested that the director 
of contracts approach both companies 
with pricing requests for masks by 
batches of 100 and 1,000 pieces. At 
the same time, detailed arrangements 
for final assembly operations at 
Dominion Arsenals should be made 
with the CIAA.34
 It is unclear if the director of 
contracts did in fact immediately 
approach the companies with 
pricing requests, but Morrison’s 
recommendation vis-à-vis Dominion 
Arsenals was indeed pursued 
throughout the summer of 1936. 
As late as August, however, the 
superintendant of Dominion Arsenals 
reported that smaller components 
and hardware required to complete 
the face piece assembly (outlet valves, 
head harness components, eye pieces, 
and the corrugated connecting tube) 
could not be procured from any local 
companies.35 Military authorities 
would have to cast a wider net 
across the country to secure all of 
the parts necessary for final assembly 
at the Dominion Arsenals plant. 
Within a couple of months, Colonel 
Carr, now director of mechanization 
and artillery (DMA), reported that 
sources and price quotes for all of 
the necessary face piece components 
had been secured. All together, 
at least eight different companies 
were required to supply everything 
required. It only remained for General 
McNaughton (now president of 
the National Research Council) to 
approve the rubber samples used in 
face pieces and outlet valves.36 Testing 
in this respect continued throughout 
the winter of 1936-37. In January 
1937, initial limited orders for most 
of the essential components had been 
placed (excepting filter containers, 
which remained to be developed). 
Major-General Clyde Caldwell, the 
master-general of ordnance (MGO), 
anticipated that 1,000 masks would 
be completed within four months. 
The War Office had promised to send 
along specifications for the containers 
so that these could also be sourced in 
Canada, but in the meantime, 3,550 
pieces were ordered from Britain.37 
With the threat of war on the horizon, 
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efforts to procure mass quantities 
of materiel now accelerated. Of 
the $96,500 allocated for anti-gas 
equipment during the 1937-38 fiscal 
year, Colonel Carr recommended that 
$52,500 be applied to the purchase of 
25,000 containers from the War Office 
and $44,000 to buy 6,000 complete 
face pieces, including their canvas 
haversacks, from Canadian sources.38 
 Just three years short of war, 
Canada approached self-sufficiency 
in basic anti-gas equipment. There 
were still, however, many wrinkles 
to iron out at all stages in the supply 
chain, including rubber finishing 
and container development. As of 
early 1937, Goodrich remained the 
only Canadian company capable 
of manufacturing serviceable face 
pieces; Gutta Percha, the Toronto-
based rubber company, was still 
working to make the grade.39 Yet even 
the Goodrich face pieces were not 
perfect. In February 1937, an early 
sampling of 340 face pieces from the 
Kitchener plant was inspected. Only 
125 of these passed. Flaws included 
defective eye sockets, porosity, 
and uneven rubber thickness.40 
Minor flaws continued to surface 
throughout 1937, although some of 
these related to smaller components 
and hardware items rather than the 
face piece itself.41 In particular, the 
domestic glass industry experienced 
some difficulty manufacturing eye 
pieces of sufficient quality to meet 
government specifications.42 
 T e c h n i c a l  p r o b l e m s , 
unfortunately, were not the only 
barriers  to  a  viable  domestic 
manufacturing program in 1937. 
That June, the government stalled on 
approval for a relatively large order of 
11,000 masks demanded by the CGS 
for the 1937-38 fiscal year. As DMA, 
Colonel Carr warned in a scathing 
memorandum that any further delays 
in the program would “seriously 
embarrass all concerned, and will 
almost certainly result in failure to 
secure the required quantities this 
year.”43 Carr underscored the quality 
control issues that slowed even the 
completion of small batch orders for 
1,000 masks. If domestic industry 
was to meet the rigorous inspection 
standards that were required for 
anti-gas equipment, it must have 
the opportunity to fill larger volume 
orders sooner rather than later. As 
Carr further explained:
Respirator  product ion is ,  in 
many respects, a unique art. The 
preservation of the art against the 
day when large quantities might 
be required at short notice is a 
problem which should receive every 
consideration… If production ceases, 
as is presently the case, there is great 
risk of losing those skilled operators 
already trained.44
 In other words, if Canadian 
companies did not exercise their 
present capabilities to manufacture 
Above: J.L. Ilsley, minister of finance, visits the B.F. Goodrich 
Company in Kitchener, Ontario in April 1944.
Right: Employees at the B.F. Goodrich plant put nails into 
Hitler’s coffin for this 1942 publicity photograph.
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t h e 
precision 
components required for respirators, 
their employees would lose the hard 
won skills developed over long 
months of trial and error. When the 
matter was brought to the attention 
of the deputy minister of defence, 
Léo La Flèche, he recommended that 
enough respirators be ordered to fill 
immediate current manufacturing 
capacity.45 Now that Gutta Percha was 
capable of turning out serviceable 
face pieces, it seemed possible that 
Canadian industry might complete 
a maximum of between 10,000 and 
12,500 masks by the end of fiscal; 
given the limited scale of testing 
facilities available, the lower figure 
was more realistic. Yet just when it 
appeared that production was really 
about to get underway, the estimated 
$32,000 required to complete the order 
was withdrawn. Mass production 
would have to wait until 1938.46 
 To a degree, the provision of 
funding was a moot point until 
Major Morrison (working on behalf 
of the DMA), and the CIAA secured 
adequate shop space – at least 3,000 
square feet – for the final assembly 
and inspection of the respirators by 
government employees. 
It was first planned 
to set up shop in 
the Dominion 
A r s e n a l s 
bui ldings 
a t  C o v e 
F i e l d s , 
Q u e b e c . 
These premises 
were presently 
o c c u p i e d  b y 
ammunition filling 
operations, but would 
be vacated sometime 
over the next year. The next 
best temporary option was to rent 
space somewhere in Quebec City. 
A number of sites were considered, 
including a Ste. Anne Street building 
formerly occupied by L’Action 
catholique newspaper.47 Ultimately, 
none of these proved satisfactory, 
either because the buildings were 
not sufficiently modern, or the rent 
was deemed too high. Finally, in May 
1938, the director of equipment and 
ordnance services (DEOS) secured 
authority to lease 3,800 square feet 
on the fourth floor of a Rue Varennes 
building.48 Much of the assembly and 
inspection work of finished product 
was to be carried out by young 
female employees. At the outset of 
production, it was estimated that 
the assembly and inspection of 1,000 
respirators would require “700 girl 
hours.”49
 With Hitler ’s  grip already 
tightening on Germany’s neighbours, 
Canada’s respirator production 
program was only just kicking 
into gear. Immediate respirator 
requirements for 1938-39 were 
pegged at 11,000 for the Militia, 600 
for the Royal Canadian Navy, and 
4,505 for the Royal Canadian Air 
A Canadian Mark V respirator; the facepiece on this example was made by the B.F. Goodrich Company, Kitchener, 1941. Note the 
molded boss on the cheek for fitting a microphone plug as required. The khaki stockinet normally used in earlier production has been 
eliminated entirely from the manufacture of the face piece and connecting tube in this case.
Table B – Canadian Respirator Component Manufacturers
Manufacturer Components Supplied
Coulter Copper & Brass Company, Toronto eye piece retaining rings, valve guards, fasteners
Gutta Percha & Rubber Company, Toronto face pieces, eye piece washers
Dominion Steel & Coal Corp., Montreal binding wire
St. Lawrence Steel & Wire Co., Gananoque harness buckles and loops
B.F. Goodrich Rubber Company, Kitchener face pieces, connecting tubes, outlet valves, harness pads
Canadian Die Casters, Galt valve holders
W.E. Phillips Company, Oshawa eye piece discs
Penmans Limited, Montreal khaki stockinette
Dominion Rubber Company, Montreal eye piece washers, rubber tape
Woods Manufacturing Co. Limited, Welland haversacks
Belding Corticelli, Montreal elastic harness webbing
Russell Manufacturing Company elastic harness webbing
Duplate Safety Glass Co. of Canada, Oshawa eye piece discs
Aluminum Company of Canada, Montreal valve holders
Byers Company Limited, Toronto harness buckles and loops
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Force.50 By mid-1938, production 
finally began to move forward, with 
more than a dozen outfits providing 
components for the finished product 
(Table B).51 Notably, the British War 
Office had by then taken a favourable 
view of the Canadian-manufactured 
face pieces.52 
 Throughout 1938-39, the number 
of contractors involved with respirator 
production increased, while some 
existing contractors began work on 
additional items. For example, when 
it was anticipated that new machine 
press moulds were to arrive from 
Britain for the manufacture of the 
Mark V respirator, DND officials 
planned to let contracts for face pieces 
to the Dominion Rubber Company.53 
As well, several other companies 
won contracts for accessories such 
as the haversacks; these included: 
S.S. Holden Limited (Ottawa) and 
J.E. Lortie (Montreal). Ultimately, 
project officers at DND preferred that 
more rather than fewer companies be 
involved in production. As Colonel 
Carr noted in April 1939, contracts 
should be “spread over as many firms 
as practicable in order to obtain as 
many potential sources of supply as 
possible in the event of an emergency 
programme having to be put into 
operation.”54
 G i v e n  t h e  c o n t e m p o r a r y 
sensational media reporting on gas 
warfare, it is not surprising that 
the press began to take a special 
interest in Canadian preparations. 
When The Toronto Star Weekly 
first requested photographs of the 
Canadian respirators and production 
facilities in late 1937, the paper 
was put off by defence officials. 
This had less to do with secrecy 
than the fact that no production 
facilities yet existed; any report on 
Canada’s homegrown respirator 
industry would have been entirely 
underwhelming.55 Undeterred, 
the Star Weekly approached Gutta 
Percha, one of the Toronto-based 
manufacturers involved with the 
program. The paper’s editor believed, 
mistakenly, that the respirators were 
being manufactured somewhere in 
Toronto, and he wanted details and 
photographs. Gutta Percha’s general 
manager, F.A. Warren, evaded 
repeated information requests, before 
writing to La Flèche in desperation. 
Perhaps, Warren suggested, it 
would be better to issue a guarded 
statement to the press rather than 
fend off repeated inquiries.56 Ottawa 
relented, and Colonel Carr drew up 
a release the next day. In essence, 
it underscored the challenges of 
coordinating Canadian industry to 
meet the precision manufacturing 
requirements for respirators. Carr 
also noted that the Canadian Mark 
IV measured up well against the 
British version (which had already 
been in production for many years), 
for approximately the same cost.57 
With the production program well 
underway by early 1939, requirements 
for the 1939-40 fiscal year were 
projected at 11,600 respirators 
for all three services.58 Changing 
circumstances soon dictated that 
this quantity be increased by a 
considerable margin. 
Containers 
The last remaining obstacle to Canadian self-sufficiency was 
the Type E container which served 
as the filter for the Mark IV system. 
It appears that Canadians did not 
embark upon detailed investigation of 
the domestic manufacture of the Type 
E-series containers until 1938-39.59 
An illustration from a 1939 training 
manual shows the new Mark V respirator 
with its haversack.
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C o m p a r e d 
with the face 
piece  development ,  however, 
the containers were relatively 
straightforward, given that there 
were only four principal components 
required:  the canister,  f i l l ing 
materials, compression springs, and 
inlet valve. On the eve of war, three of 
these four components were already 
being manufactured in Canada. 
Ontario Metal Specialties (Bronte, 
Ontario) was the first company 
to produce the canister, although 
General Steel Wares later produced 
very large quantities. Steele Brothers 
(Guelph) turned out the springs, 
while Seiberling Rubber Company 
(Toronto) handled the inlet valves. 
The filling materials, which were 
responsible for neutralizing any war 
gases inhaled through the container, 
were still imported from Britain at 
this time, at least in part because the 
formula was a strictly guarded War 
Office secret. The containers were 
assembled and filled at the National 
Research Council Annex, at the 
corner of Sussex and John Streets 
in Ottawa, apparently due to space 
limitations at the respirator assembly 
shop in Quebec.60 (See Table C 
for details on containers.) 
 Late in the war, chemical 
warfare experts determined that 
the conventional Type E filter 
did not afford sufficient protection 
against certain agents. One of these, 
cyanogen chloride (known as CK or 
CNCl) was an especially toxic blood 
agent. Another was prussic acid (AC 
or HCN), more properly known as 
hydrogen cyanide, and now infamous 
for its widespread use in Nazi death 
camps. Although Allied intelligence 
reports doubted that the Germans 
were apt to use CK “in any wholesale 
manner in the immediate future,” 
chemical warfare experts felt that 
RAF and RCAF personnel who, after 
1943, were still equipped with the 
Mark IV and V series respirators (as 
opposed to the new light respirator) 
might need extra protection.61 One 
option was to treat ordinary Type 
E containers with a solvent called 
pyridine. Another option was to 
retrofit Mark IV and V respirators 
with the Type E “green dot” high 
performance container, a new variant 
that offered better protection than the 
old Type E, and so called because a 
small green dot was painted on the 
top of the container.62 Late in the 
war, Lieutenant-Colonel E.A. Flood, 
the superintendent of Canada’s 
Chemical Warfare Laboratories, 
doubted that the current threat was 
severe enough to warrant wholesale 
pyridine treatment. Given that the 
70,000 green dot containers held in 
reserve for the Canadian Army were 
no longer required (because of the 
general issue of the light respirator 
to the Canadian Army Overseas after 
1943), these were made available to 
the RCAF. Meanwhile, the Canadian 
Army retained a reserve of 100,000 
Mark II green dot containers for the 
light respirator.63 
Conclusion
On the eve of war Canada’s d o m e s t i c  m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
capacity was firmly grounded in 
the chemical warfare sector. The 
Canadian government felt secure 
enough with this knowledge to 
refuse offers to purchase British-
made respirators in the dark summer 
of 1939.64 On the contrary, Canada 
would soon be in a position to 
export chemical warfare equipment 
to friendly countries, some of which 
had already made enquiries.65 By the 
summer of 1940, Colonel Morrison, 
still working for the DMA, was 
striving for an output rate of 6,000 
respirators per week. To help meet 
this demand, companies like B.F. 
Goodrich were turning out face 
pieces 24 hours a day.66 By early 1941, 
Canada had produced in excess of 
250,000 respirators (excluding naval 
and air force contracts), and was now 
in a position to export surplus output 
to allies.67 Taking the Type E container 
A Type E “green dot” container 
designed to offer improved protection 
against cyanogen chloride and 
hydrogen cyanide. The dime-sized 
green dot is clearly visible on the 
top right side, partly over top of the 
“GSW” stamping. GSW stands for 
General Steel Wares, a Canadian 
company that manufactured 
a variety of metal products 
for Canada’s military forces, 
especially ammunition boxes, 
steel helmets, and canisters 
for respirator containers. This 
particular canister was made 
at GSW’s MacDonald Plant in 
Toronto.
Table C – Container Variants
Type Colour Purpose
Type A dull blue For training only
Type E Marks I, II, II, IV brown / red oxide For operational use in Canada only
Type E Mark V brown / red oxide For operational use overseas, included an improved inlet valve
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as an example, Canada had turned 
out more than 600,000 pieces by the 
end of 1941, of which 175,000 were 
supplied to South African troops and 
nearly 60,000 to New Zealanders.68 
This great production capacity was 
the glad consequence of several years 
of challenging developmental work 
undertaken by Canadian industries 
and a small group of army officers. 
Besides respirators, there were many 
other items in Canadian service 
that followed similarly complex 
development paths from the drawing 
board to the shop floor to the soldier’s 
kit.
 At the outset of the Second World 
War, Allied intelligence estimates 
suggested that if German forces 
did resort to gas, they were likely 
to employ tactics similar to those of 
the 1918 spring counteroffensives. 
This meant that persistent agents, 
such as Yellow Cross, would be 
used to neutralize strong points, 
create physical barriers, or simply 
immobilize basic defences. As the 
British braced for what seemed a 
likely German invasion of the home 
islands in 1940, it was anticipated 
that aircraft would serve as the 
primary mode of delivery.69 British 
assumptions regarding the potential 
tactical employment of gas by German 
forces were essentially rational, given 
the information available at the time 
and the experience of the First World 
War. What if there had been such an 
attack? Speaking to the Canadian 
Institute of Chemistry at Hamilton, 
Ontario in June 1942, Lieutenant-
Colonel Flood, the superintendent 
of Canada’s Chemical Warfare 
Laboratories, noted that well trained 
soldiers equipped with anti-gas 
respirators and protective clothing 
would be more or less invulnerable to 
gas tactics. Indeed, it would probably 
be easier to prevent casualties by gas 
than by shot or shell.70 
 At the time of Flood’s speech 
before the Institute of Chemistry, 
Canadian soldiers were indeed well 
kitted out with anti-gas respirators 
and other protective equipment, 
but it had been a close call. As late 
as Christmas 1939, it appears that 
there were not enough respirators to 
go around to all Canadian soldiers 
stationed in Britain.71 As with other 
war supplies, this state of affairs 
gradually changed for the better 
over the next year. Canada not only 
produced enough equipment for 
its own forces, but was also able to 
supply other Allied nations with anti-
gas components. This manufacturing 
program represented only one 
small component of Canada’s larger 
military output. It also underscored 
the reality, all too often overlooked 
in macro-level study of military 
logistics and the Second World War 
Materialschlacht, that the ability to 
produce sophisticated equipment 
does not simply exist in nature, but 
more often than not, is the result 
of years of frustrating trial, error, 
negotiation, and false starts.
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